Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Forthcoming

31 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2012 Last revised: 20 Jun 2014

See all articles by Shakun D. Mago

Shakun D. Mago

University of Richmond - E. Claiborne Robins School of Business

Anya Samek

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management; Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR)

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Date Written: June 13, 2014

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments we find significant over-expenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort, but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and significantly affects the dynamics of individual behavior. A behavioral model which incorporates a non-monetary utility of winning and relative payoff maximization explains significant over-expenditure of effort. It also suggests that decrease in ‘social distance’ between group members through social identification promotes pro-social behavior and decreases over-expenditure of effort, while improved information feedback decreases the heterogeneity of effort.

Keywords: contest, information, identification, over-dissipation, experiments

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Mago, Shakun Datta and Samek, Anya and Sheremeta, Roman M., Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests (June 13, 2014). Journal of Conflict Resolution, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2080409 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2080409

Shakun Datta Mago

University of Richmond - E. Claiborne Robins School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23173
United States

Anya Samek (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive #0553
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093-0553
United States

HOME PAGE: http://anyasamek.com

Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) ( email )

635 Downey Way
Los Angeles, CA 90089-3332
United States

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
342
Abstract Views
1,811
Rank
160,844
PlumX Metrics