The Role of the Manager?S Human Capital in Discretionary Disclosure
Posted: 2 Feb 2000
Abstract
Prior studies have characterized Verrecchias (1983) discretionary disclosure costs mainly in terms of competitive concerns. This study shows that separating the managers and the shareholders into two separate, self-interested beings also leads to disclosure costs, precluding discretionary disclosure in certain cases.
JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34, M41, M45, J33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Nagar, Venky, The Role of the Manager?S Human Capital in Discretionary Disclosure. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=208273
Venky Nagar (Contact Author)
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-647-3292 (Phone)
734-764-3146 (Fax)
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