Estimating Damages from Price-Fixing - The Value of Transaction Data

35 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2012

See all articles by Kai Hüschelrath

Kai Hüschelrath

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Kathrin Mueller

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Tobias Veith

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.

Keywords: Antitrust policy, private enforcement, cartels, overcharge, damages, cement

JEL Classification: L41, L61, K21

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai and Mueller, Kathrin and Veith, Tobias, Estimating Damages from Price-Fixing - The Value of Transaction Data (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-036, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084690 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084690

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Kathrin Mueller

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Tobias Veith

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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