Veritistic Epistemology and the Epistemic Goals of Groups: A Reply to Vähämaa

Abstract

In his “Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge,” Miika Vähämaa claims that the epistemic goal of most groups is a “shared understanding of how things are.” Vähämaa uses Don Fallis’s 2007 article on “Collective Epistemic Goals” as a prime example of the wrong way to talk about the epistemic goals of groups. In that article, Fallis claims that it is possible for groups themselves (and not just their individual members) to have epistemic goals, such as acquiring true beliefs and avoiding error. In this note, we argue that there is really no deep disagreement between the Vähämaa’s article and Fallis’s article. Any impression that there is is based on a misunderstanding of Fallis’s article and/or of the larger project of veritistic epistemology.

Keywords: collective epistemology, epistemic goals, group belief, knowledge, truth, social epistemology