Do CEOs of State-Owned Enterprises Matter? Evidence from Brazil, 1973-1993
40 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2012
Date Written: June 26, 2012
Abstract
We study if CEOs and their backgrounds matter for the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exploiting the fact that these companies had different CEOs (with different backgrounds) in different moments in time. We construct a database of Brazilian SOEs between 1973 and 1993 and make three tests. First, we use variance decomposition to study CEO effects. Second, we look at how much of the variation in performance can be explained by CEOs who switch companies. Third, we test if CEO background and ability matter for performance. We find sizable effects of CEOs on performance, especially for military managers and those who attended top universities.
Keywords: State-owned enterprises, CEOs, military CEOs, bureaucrats, state capitalism
JEL Classification: M51, P51, L33, P27, N56, D22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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