Local Logrolling? Examining the Impact of District Representation on Distributive Politics

28 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2012 Last revised: 19 Aug 2012

See all articles by Vladimir Kogan

Vladimir Kogan

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science

Craig M. Burnett

Hofstra University

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

Over the past three decades, efforts to increase minority incorporation and representation have resulted in a shift away from at-large toward district-based elections in American cities. Observers and academics have blamed this institutional change for encouraging elected official to focus on district priorities while ignoring --- and perhaps even sacrificing --- broader municipal needs. Have improved electoral prospects for minority candidates come at the cost of parochialism and logrolling on city councils, as traditional models of urban and distributive politics predict? Using seven years worth of roll call data from the Los Angeles city council, we examine the hypothesis that district elections lead to vote-trading among its members. Overall, our analysis finds little evidence for distributive theories of legislative voting. Instead, the results support a model of conditional deference, suggesting that a district-based electoral system does not always incentivize elected officials to ignore the larger concerns of their polity when creating policy.

Keywords: district elections, logrolling, distributive politics, minority incorporation

Suggested Citation

Kogan, Vladimir and Burnett, Craig M., Local Logrolling? Examining the Impact of District Representation on Distributive Politics (2012). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2107863

Vladimir Kogan (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Columbus, OH 43210
United States

Craig M. Burnett

Hofstra University ( email )

Hempstead, NY 11549
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.hofstra.edu/craig_burnett

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