The Power of Administrative Ethics: Moving Beyond Moralism and Instrumentalism

34th EGPA/IIAS Annual Conference, PSG VII : Ethics and Integrity of Governance, September 2012

ETHICS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, 2nd edition, H. George Frederickson and Richard K.Ghere, eds., Forthcoming

Queen's University Belfast Law Research Paper No. 12-05

42 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2012

See all articles by Ciarán O'Kelly

Ciarán O'Kelly

Queen's University Belfast - School of Law

Melvin Dubnick

University of New Hampshire

Date Written: July 18, 2012

Abstract

This paper makes the case for an approach to administrative ethics that regards it as a form of political power within contexts of organization and organizational change (reform). After articulating the logic of this perspective, it is applied to two cases of reform (No Child Left Behind in the US and National Health Service reform in the UK) where reformers have used the power of metrics and high-stakes accountability to force change -- and in the process have altered the respective ethical landscapes.

Keywords: adminstrative ethics, governance, reform, NHS, no child left behind

JEL Classification: D73, G30

Suggested Citation

O'Kelly, Ciarán and Dubnick, Melvin, The Power of Administrative Ethics: Moving Beyond Moralism and Instrumentalism (July 18, 2012). 34th EGPA/IIAS Annual Conference, PSG VII : Ethics and Integrity of Governance, September 2012, ETHICS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, 2nd edition, H. George Frederickson and Richard K.Ghere, eds., Forthcoming, Queen's University Belfast Law Research Paper No. 12-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2112136

Ciarán O'Kelly (Contact Author)

Queen's University Belfast - School of Law ( email )

School of Law
Belfast BT7 1NN, BT7 1NN
Ireland

Melvin Dubnick

University of New Hampshire ( email )

20 Academic Way
Horton Hall
Durham, NH 03824
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mjdubnick.dubnick.net

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
150
Abstract Views
968
Rank
352,794
PlumX Metrics