Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability

9 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2012 Last revised: 15 Mar 2013

See all articles by Sergio Currarini

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics

Marco A. Marini

Marco A. Marini; University of Rome La Sapienza

Date Written: August 9, 2012

Abstract

The aim of this note is to discuss previously unnoticed stability properties of majoritarian decision making. We study collective decisions problems that can be described in terms of symmetric games satisfying various regularity conditions. We show that restricting the objecting power to majoritarian coalitions guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations, independently of the assumptions on the behaviour of players in the minority. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability may require a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.

Keywords: Majority Rule, Supermajority, Externalities, Core

JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco A., Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability (August 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2137664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2137664

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

School of Business
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)

Marco A. Marini ( email )

Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5
Roma, 00185
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/marcomarini/

University of Rome La Sapienza ( email )

29
Roma, 00185
Italy
+39 06 49910843 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/marcomarini

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