Environmental Remedies: An Incomplete Information Aggregation Game

42 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2000

See all articles by Gordon C. Rausser

Gordon C. Rausser

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Leo K. Simon

U.C. Berkeley, Dept of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Jinhua Zhao

Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management

Date Written: May 2000

Abstract

The burden of resolving an environmental problem is typically shared among several responsible parties. To clarify the nature and extent of the problem, these parties must provide information to the regulator. Based on this information, the regulator will instigate an investigation of the problem, to determine an appropriate remedy. This paper investigates the incentives facing agents to promote excessive investigation and postpone remediation. Our incomplete information game-theoretic model may be of general interest to game theorists: we apply a new theorem guaranteeing pure-strategy equilibria and introduce a class of games called "aggregation games" which have interesting properties and are widely applicable.

JEL Classification: D82, Q28

Suggested Citation

Rausser, Gordon C. and Simon, Leo K. and Zhao, Jinhua, Environmental Remedies: An Incomplete Information Aggregation Game (May 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=213835 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.213835

Gordon C. Rausser (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

207 Giannini Hall no. 3310
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-6591 (Phone)
510-643-0287 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://are.berkeley.edu/~rausser/

Leo K. Simon

U.C. Berkeley, Dept of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

207 Giannini Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-8430 (Phone)
510-643-8911 (Fax)

Jinhua Zhao

Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/jinhuazhao

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