Company Delistings from the UN Global Compact: Limited Business Demand or Domestic Governance Failure?

50 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2012

See all articles by Jette Steen Knudsen

Jette Steen Knudsen

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Date Written: April 19, 2011

Abstract

While a substantial literature describes corporate benefits of CSR initiatives, the literature is silent concerning why some companies announce CSR initiatives yet fail to implement them. The article examines company delistings from the UN Global Compact. Delistings are surprising because the CSR agenda is seen as having won the battle of ideas. The analysis proceeds in two parts. I first analyze firm level characteristics focusing on geography while controlling for sector and size; I find that geography is a significant factor while small firms are more likely to be delisted than large firms and some sector characteristics determine delistings. Next, I proceed to uncover country level characteristics including the degree of international economic interdependence as well as the quality of governance institutions. Multivariate regression analysis shows that companies are less likely to be delisted from countries where domestic governance institutions are well-functioning. To a lesser extent I find that firms from countries with international economies are more willing to comply with UN Global Compact requirements. Countries with a high share of outward FDI/capita have a lower share of delisted firms as do countries that are internationally competitive.

Keywords: Business/Government Interaction and Relations, Corporate Social Responsibility, Country Variables, Global Institutions, Political Economy

Suggested Citation

Knudsen, Jette S., Company Delistings from the UN Global Compact: Limited Business Demand or Domestic Governance Failure? (April 19, 2011). Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 3, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2139325

Jette S. Knudsen (Contact Author)

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

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