Contractual Liability of Government of India

10 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2012 Last revised: 19 Sep 2012

See all articles by Jelis Subhan

Jelis Subhan

ITM University - School of Law; AMITY UNIVERSITY CHHATTISGARH; Amity University - Amity Law School

Date Written: March 16, 2010

Abstract

The subject of government contracts has assumed great importance in the modern times. Today the state is a source of wealth. In the modern era of a welfare state, government's economic activities are expanding and the government is increasingly assuming the role of the dispenser of a large number of benefits. Today a large number of individuals and business organizations enjoy largess in the form of government contracts, licenses, quotas, mineral rights, jobs, etc. This raises the possibility of exercise of power by a government to dispense largess in an arbitrary manner. It is axiomatic that the government or any of its agencies ought not to be allowed to act arbitrarily and confer benefits on whomsoever they want. Therefore there is a necessity to develop some norms to regulate and protect individual interest in such wealth and thus structure and discipline the government discretion to confer such benefits.The present article intends to focus upon the contractual liability of the Government of India envisaged in Constitution of India and the provisions of the Indian Contract Act governing the same.

Keywords: government contract, Indian Contract Act, Constitution of India

Suggested Citation

Subhan, Jelis and Subhan, Jelis, Contractual Liability of Government of India (March 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2145139 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2145139

Jelis Subhan (Contact Author)

ITM University - School of Law ( email )

Naya Raipur
Raipur
India

AMITY UNIVERSITY CHHATTISGARH ( email )

AMITY UNIVERSITY CHHATTISGARH
RAIPUR
India

Amity University - Amity Law School ( email )

Sector 125, F-1 Block
I-2 Block, Ground Floor
Noida, UT Uttar Pradesh 201313
India

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