Learning in Networks – An Experimental Study Using Stationary Concepts

19 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2012

See all articles by Siegfried Berninghaus

Siegfried Berninghaus

Institut fuer Statistik und Mathematische Wirtscha

Thomas Neumann

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg

Bodo Vogt

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

Date Written: July 11, 2012

Abstract

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different strategy against each of them. The games were played in two network structures: a lattice and a circle. We compare our results with the predictions of different theories (Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) and the experimental results of Selten and Chmura (2008). One result is that the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor. As another result we observe an order of predictive success for the stationary concepts that is different from the order shown by Selten and Chmura.

Keywords: stationary concepts, networks, learning, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C70, C73, C91, D83, D85

Suggested Citation

Berninghaus, Siegfried and Neumann, Thomas and Vogt, Bodo, Learning in Networks – An Experimental Study Using Stationary Concepts (July 11, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2168327 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168327

Siegfried Berninghaus

Institut fuer Statistik und Mathematische Wirtscha ( email )

Building 20.21
Universitaet Karlsruhe Gebaeude 20.21
76128 Karlsruhe
Germany

Thomas Neumann (Contact Author)

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg ( email )

Universitätspl. 2
PSF 4120
Magdeburg, D-39106
Germany

Bodo Vogt

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

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