The Devil is in the Details: Transitional Justice and African Peace Agreements

Abstract

In the aftermath of violent conflict, opposing parties in four African countries including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone have worked to achieve regional stability through the attainment of peace agreements. While the first priority of a peace agreement is to bring an end to violence, signatories of late have also included specific and detailed provisions regarding transitional justice mechanisms. In theory, the use of transitional justice mechanisms takes into account the different experiences of victims, perpetrators and observers, including the relationships among them, in an attempt to promote justice and reconciliation. In reality however, this process can be unfairly skewed in favor of a single party. A study of these four peace agreements revealed that alleged human rights violators are often heavily involved in the negotiation of such transitional justice provisions without reciprocal victim representation, transparency and dialogue.

This article examines the four basic areas of transitional justice mechanisms including prosecutions, truth-telling, institutional reform and reparations. It further argues that the inclusion of detailed and specific transitional justice blueprints in the initial stage of the peace process is not justified because they undermine the pursuits of justice, conflict resolution and state building. This article concludes that while peace agreements should establish a baseline for future transitional justice strategies, inclusion of such blueprints in the early stages of the peace process is not always beneficial for victims and human rights activists.

Keywords: transitional justice, human rights, peace agreements