Does Transparency Harm Traders: Evidence from a Disclosure Regulation

19 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2012 Last revised: 15 Jan 2013

See all articles by Saptarshi Mukherjee

Saptarshi Mukherjee

New York University Stern School of Business; Northeastern University

Date Written: November 20, 2012

Abstract

Does transparency harm block traders? In 2004, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) mandated the disclosure of trades accumulating to more than 0.5% of existing float in a single day. Using unique transaction-level database from the National Stock Exchange (NSE) in India, we present evidence that block traders earn substantially higher returns by disclosing their trades than by executing bulk deals. Robustness checks show that liquidity provision or other explanations are not enough to explain this return differential. Disclosure leads to lower future spreads, lower price volatility and smaller price momentum and reversal. Hence, we argue that disclosing large trades lead to higher market efficiency.

Keywords: Transparency, Efficiency, Emerging Market, Market Regulation

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G18, G24, D40

Suggested Citation

Mukherjee, Saptarshi, Does Transparency Harm Traders: Evidence from a Disclosure Regulation (November 20, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2178800 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178800

Saptarshi Mukherjee (Contact Author)

New York University Stern School of Business ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

Northeastern University ( email )

Boston, MA 02115
United States

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