Personal Autonomy, Freedom of Action, and Coercion
A Question of Values: New Canadian Perspectives in Ethics and Political Philosophy, Brennan, Samantha, Tracy Isaacs, and Michael Milde (eds), Value Inquiry Book Series, Rodopi Press, 1997
22 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2012 Last revised: 10 Jan 2013
Date Written: 1997
Abstract
This paper defends three central theses. 1) The recent literature on personal autonomy can perspicuously be classified as defending either internalist or externalist theories of autonomy. 2) All internalist theories of autonomy can recognize only internal threats to personal autonomy, such as weakness of will or compulsion. They cannot recognize strictly external factors as undermining autonomy. Thus they must draw a radical divide between freedom of the will or autonomy, and freedom of action. But this separation thesis is indefensible, since restrictions on freedom of action can surely undermine autonomy. 3) Internalist theories of autonomy cannot provide a plausible account of why coerced actions are nonautonomous.
Keywords: Action, Autonomy, Freedom, Desires, Harry Frankfurt
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