The Communication Tree Value for TU-Games with Graph Communication

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2012-095

24 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2012

See all articles by Tural Huseynov

Tural Huseynov

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Dolf Talman

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: November 29, 2012

Abstract

A new solution is presented for transferable utility games with graph communication where the cooperation possibilities are represented by a graph. Players are only able to cooperate and obtain some worth in a coalition if they form a connected set in the given graph. To determine the payoff for each player, a single-valued solution, the communication tree value, is proposed for this class of games. The idea is that to form the grand coalition of all players a player can join a set of players only if this player is connected in the graph to at least one of the players in the set. To a set of players, starting with an arbitrary single player, from each maximally connected subset of remaining players one player joins who is connected to one or more of the players in that set. In this way a (rooted) tree on the set of players is obtained, called a communication tree. For a given game each communication tree of the graph induces a marginal contribution vector, in which any player receives a payoff equal to what he contributes in worth when he joins his subordinates in the tree. The average payoff over all communication trees of the graph determines the value. In case the underlying graph is cycle-complete the value coincides with the average tree solution. When there is complete communication between all players, which is the special case of cycle-completeness, players join one by one, yielding the Shapley value. A weak form of convexity is introduced, under which the value is guaranteed to be an element of the core. For games with complete graph communication the condition coincides with convexity and in case the underlying graph is cycle-free it is weaker than super-additivity.

Keywords: Cooperative game, communication structure, Myerson value, core stability

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Huseynov, Tural and Talman, Dolf J. J., The Communication Tree Value for TU-Games with Graph Communication (November 29, 2012). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2012-095, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2183065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2183065

Tural Huseynov (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Dolf J. J. Talman

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2346 (Phone)

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