Logical Pillars of the Public Decision: From the Logic of Cooperation to the Political Market

Abstract

The logic of cooperation substantiates the strategic powers of the public agents and their coalitions, thus bringing contribution to understanding the political mechanisms which determine the public decision. The public bodies, derived from a process of political choice turn into account the logic of cooperation in view to establish own managerial structures. In most situations, the political cooperation will represent a consequence of negotiation, based on political programmes, their compatibility as well as the voting power of the actors/political agents. The political market will represent the support of political cooperation and public decision, thus contributing to understanding of social phenomena such as the political or electoral ones.

The current paper aims to emphasize the logical mechanisms of public decision in the context of the necessity to create post electoral coalitions, aimed at maximization of the impact of political options of the electorate. The empirical examples will refer to the recent local elections in Bucharest Municipality. The main tool consists in the 'voting power' of the political agents and the results will substantiate a theoretical framework aimed to highlight the logical and systemic connections of public decision with the political market.

The research methods will take into consideration both documentation and theoretical analysis, empirical research, modelling and statistic interpretation.

Keywords: public decision, logic of cooperation, political market, voting power

JEL Classification: D73