Field Experiment Estimate of Electoral Fraud in Russian Parliamentary Elections

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Forthcoming

8 Pages Posted: 25 Dec 2012

See all articles by Ruben Enikolopov

Ruben Enikolopov

New Economic School; Institute of Political Economy and Governance; ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona GSE

Vasily Korovkin

CERGE-EI

Maria Petrova

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona School of Economics; Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA)

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy

Alexei Zakharov

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy

Date Written: December 24, 2012

Abstract

Electoral fraud is a widespread phenomenon, especially outside the developed world. Despite abundant qualitative and anecdotal evidence on its existence from around the world, there is very limited quantitative evidence on the extent of electoral fraud. We exploit random assignment of independent observers to 156 of 3,164 polling stations in the city of Moscow to estimate the effect of electoral fraud on the outcome of the Russian parliamentary elections held on December 4, 2011. We estimate the actual share of votes for the incumbent United Russia party to be at least 11 percentage points lower than the official count (36% instead of 47%). Our results suggest that the extent of the fraud was sufficient to have had a substantial impact on the outcome of the elections; they also confirm that the presence of observers is an important factor in ensuring the integrity of the procedure.

Keywords: electoral fraud, field experiment, Russia, nondemocratic government

JEL Classification: P16, C93

Suggested Citation

Enikolopov, Ruben and Enikolopov, Ruben and Korovkin, Vasily and Petrova, Maria and Sonin, Konstantin and Zakharov, Alexei, Field Experiment Estimate of Electoral Fraud in Russian Parliamentary Elections (December 24, 2012). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2193638

Ruben Enikolopov

New Economic School ( email )

Nobel 3
Moscow, Moscow 121205
Russia

Institute of Political Economy and Governance ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

ICREA ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Vasily Korovkin

CERGE-EI ( email )

Politickych veznu 7
Prague, 111 21
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://www.vaskorovkin.com

Maria Petrova

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA) ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

Konstantin Sonin (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Alexei Zakharov

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
383
Abstract Views
3,862
Rank
141,242
PlumX Metrics