Do Trained Actors Learn Strategic Behaviour or Are They Selected into Their Positions? Empirical Evidence from Penalty Kicking

38 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2013

See all articles by Roger Berger

Roger Berger

University of Leipzig - Department of Sociology

Date Written: March 1, 2013

Abstract

This paper studies if the Minimax theorem holds for the behaviour of trained and untrained actors in the field. This is explored with data from 1043 football penalty kicks from professionals of the German Bundesliga and for 268 penalty kicks from untrained players. Minimax makes good predictions about the collective patterns emerging from the behaviour of experienced actors, as well as about their individual strategic actions. However, this is not true for untrained actors. In the next step it is explored if, the professional players learned their behaviour, or if they were selected into their roles because they had the required abilities. The data suggests that the professionals were selected by the competitive conditions of professional sports.

Keywords: Minimax, untrained actors, learning, selection

JEL Classification: C72, C93

Suggested Citation

Berger, Roger David, Do Trained Actors Learn Strategic Behaviour or Are They Selected into Their Positions? Empirical Evidence from Penalty Kicking (March 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2235778 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2235778

Roger David Berger (Contact Author)

University of Leipzig - Department of Sociology ( email )

Beethovenstr. 15
Leipzig, 04107
Germany

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