A Theory of the Competitive Saving Motive

78 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2013 Last revised: 5 Mar 2023

See all articles by Qingyuan Du

Qingyuan Du

Columbia University

Shang-Jin Wei

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 2013

Abstract

Motivated by recent empirical work, this paper formalizes a theory of competitive savings - an arms race in household savings for mating competition that is made more fierce by an increase in the male-to-female ratio in the pre-marital cohort. Relative to the empirical work, the theory can clarify a number of important questions: What determines the strength of the savings response by males (or households with a son)? Can women (or households with a daughter) dis-save? What are the conditions under which aggregate savings would go up in response to a higher sex ratio? This theory can potentially help to understand the savings patterns in China, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other economies that have experienced a dramatic increase in the pre-marital sex ratio.

Suggested Citation

Du, Qingyuan and Wei, Shang-Jin, A Theory of the Competitive Saving Motive (March 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w18911, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2237824

Qingyuan Du (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

Shang-Jin Wei

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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