Working for a Good Cause

37 Pages Posted: 15 May 2013

See all articles by Robert Dur

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Robin Zoutenbier

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

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Date Written: May 15, 2013

Abstract

A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. We find strong evidence for a mutually reinforcing role of altruism and mission alignment in sorting to the public sector, particularly among highly educated workers and among workers in less-developed countries.

Keywords: public service motivation, altruism, mission preferences, sorting, World Values Survey

JEL Classification: H100, J450, M500

Suggested Citation

Dur, Robert and Zoutenbier, Robin, Working for a Good Cause (May 15, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4227, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2265180 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2265180

Robert Dur (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur

Tinbergen Institute

Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Robin Zoutenbier

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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