Incentives for Eliciting Confidence Intervals

Posted: 30 May 2013

See all articles by Karl H. Schlag

Karl H. Schlag

University of Vienna - Department of Economics

Joel J. van der Weele

University of Amsterdam - Center for Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED); Tinbergen Institute; Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Date Written: May 28, 2013

Abstract

A natural way to obtain information about the concentration and dispersion of an expert’s beliefs is to ask for a confidence interval. Our objective is to design an elicitation mechanism that rewards the expert on the basis of the realized event and satisfies a set of desirable properties. We show that the existing mechanisms fail some of these properties, and formulate a new mechanism – the Truncated Interval Scoring Rule – that has all properties and is easily implementable in experimental work.

Keywords: Belief elicitation, scoring rules, subjective probabilities, confidence intervals

JEL Classification: C60, C91, D81

Suggested Citation

Schlag, Karl H. and van der Weele, Joel J., Incentives for Eliciting Confidence Intervals (May 28, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2271061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2271061

Karl H. Schlag

University of Vienna - Department of Economics ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

Joel J. Van der Weele (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Center for Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joelvdweele/

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Center for Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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