Structural Remedies: A Unique Antitrust Tool

Concurrences 2-2013

23 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2013

See all articles by David Bosco

David Bosco

Aix-Marseille University

Robert Saint Esteben

Bredin Prat

Virginie Beaumenier

Autorite de la Concurrence

P. Alexiadis

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

Elsa Sependa

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

Stephen Kinsella

Sidley Austin LLP

David Went

Sidley Austin LLP

Date Written: May 30, 2013

Abstract

The French Competition Authority has been given a new power by the legislator: it can order structural injunctions when the price conditions charged by a dominant undertaking are unusually high on the French overseas territories. Clearly, this legal instrument is sui generis in France. It is so too at the European Union level and in the UK where a comparable instrument already exists. This Trends invites a reflexion on this exceptional instrument.

Keywords: Structural remedies, antitrust, competition law, competition authorities

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L41

Suggested Citation

Bosco, David and Saint Esteben, Robert and Beaumenier, Virginie and Alexiadis, P. and Sependa, Elsa and Kinsella, Stephen and Went, David, Structural Remedies: A Unique Antitrust Tool (May 30, 2013). Concurrences 2-2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2271992

David Bosco (Contact Author)

Aix-Marseille University ( email )

3 Avenue Robert Schuman
3 Avenue Robert Schuman,
Aix-en-Provence, 13628
France

Robert Saint Esteben

Bredin Prat ( email )

130 rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré
Paris, 75008
France

Virginie Beaumenier

Autorite de la Concurrence ( email )

11 Rue de l'Echelle
75001 Paris

P. Alexiadis

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP ( email )

1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Elsa Sependa

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP ( email )

1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Stephen Kinsella

Sidley Austin LLP ( email )

One First National Plaza
Chicago, IL 60603
United States

David Went

Sidley Austin LLP ( email )

One First National Plaza
Chicago, IL 60603
United States

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