Remuneration of Non-Executive Directors in German Listed Firms: An Empirical Note

HHL Research Paper Series in Corporate Governance, No. 12, May 2013

19 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2013

See all articles by Christian Lazar

Christian Lazar

Ravensburg-Weingarten University

Yves Metzner

Philipps University Marburg

Marc Steffen Rapp

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics; University of Marburg - Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics (MACIE)

Michael Wolff

University of Göttingen

Date Written: March 12, 2013

Abstract

In the last years, non-executive directors are facing increasing duties and (legal) responsibilities. From that perspective, it is quite surprising that the remuneration of non-executive directors has received rather little attention so far. In this study we examine the German experience. We present the status quo of non-executive director remuneration and discuss its challenges. Specifically, we will look at the level of director remuneration and the (possible) problem of limited incentives.

Keywords: Non-executive compensation, incentives, corporate governance, Germany

Suggested Citation

Lazar, Christian and Metzner, Yves and Rapp, Marc Steffen and Wolff, Michael, Remuneration of Non-Executive Directors in German Listed Firms: An Empirical Note (March 12, 2013). HHL Research Paper Series in Corporate Governance, No. 12, May 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2272993 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2272993

Christian Lazar

Ravensburg-Weingarten University ( email )

Yves Metzner

Philipps University Marburg ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 24
Marburg, D-35032
Germany

Marc Steffen Rapp (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany

University of Marburg - Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics (MACIE) ( email )

Am Plan
Marburg, 35032
Germany

Michael Wolff

University of Göttingen ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, DE 37073
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.contolling.uni-goettingen.de

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