Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm

34 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2013

See all articles by Steven J. Brams

Steven J. Brams

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

D. Marc Kilgour

Wilfrid Laurier University - Department of Mathematics

Christian Klamler

University of Graz

Date Written: June 2013

Abstract

Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in which any item named by both players in the same round goes into a “contested pile", AL may reduce, or even eliminate the contested pile, allocating additional or more preferred items to the players. The allocation(s) that AL yields are Pareto-optimal, envy-free, and maximal; as the number of items (assumed even) increases, the probability that AL allocates all the items appears to approach infinity if all possible rankings are equi-probable. Although AL is potentially manipulable, strategizing under it would be difficult in practice.

Keywords: two-person fair division, indivisible items, envy-freeness, efficiency, algorithm

JEL Classification: C70, C78, D61, D63

Suggested Citation

Brams, Steven and Kilgour, D. Marc and Klamler, Christian, Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm (June 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2274167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274167

Steven Brams (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

Dept. of Politics
19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl.
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-8510 (Phone)
212-995-4184 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams.html

D. Marc Kilgour

Wilfrid Laurier University - Department of Mathematics ( email )

Christian Klamler

University of Graz ( email )

Graz
Austria

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