Trade Reforms, Credibility, and Development

28 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2000 Last revised: 4 Nov 2022

See all articles by Joshua Aizenman

Joshua Aizenman

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 1991

Abstract

This paper analyzes the role of investment policies in regimes undergoing trade liberalization with policy makers of uncertain credibility. We consider an economy producing exportable and importable goods. The economy is liberalized, and tariffs are eliminated. The public views the reform credibility as questionable, and expects the possibility of future policy reversal. The policy maker sets policies and public investment as to maximize the expected utility of a risk averse representative agent. We identify the need to tax private investment in the importable sector, and to subsidize private investment in the outward-oriented sector. We show that the signaling effect of public investment nay generate a positive externality for public investment in the outward sector, and a negative externality for public investment in the inward-oriented activity. We demonstrate that the elimination of sectorial private investment policies call for a rise in the public/private capital ratio in the outward-oriented activities, and a drop in that ratio in the inward-oriented activities. In the presence of an external credit ceiling, a higher degree of risk aversion increases the magnitude (without changing the nature) of the policies.

Suggested Citation

Aizenman, Joshua, Trade Reforms, Credibility, and Development (January 1991). NBER Working Paper No. w3600, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=227991

Joshua Aizenman (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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