Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany

34 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2013

See all articles by Robert Dur

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Robin Zoutenbier

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

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Date Written: June 17, 2013

Abstract

We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker’s altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker’s laziness depending on his altruism. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these patterns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring industries; and that the difference in altruism is already present at the start of people’s career, while the difference in laziness is only present for employees with sufficiently long work experience.

Keywords: public service motivation, altruism, laziness, sorting, public sector employment, personality characteristics

JEL Classification: H100, J450, M500

Suggested Citation

Dur, Robert and Zoutenbier, Robin, Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany (June 17, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4276, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2280303 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2280303

Robert Dur (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur

Tinbergen Institute

Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Robin Zoutenbier

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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