Stable Matching with Incomplete Information

73 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2013

See all articles by Qingmin Liu

Qingmin Liu

Columbia University

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: June 17, 2013

Abstract

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete-information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete-information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price-sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete-information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations.

Keywords: Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D5, D

Suggested Citation

Liu, Qingmin and Mailath, George J. and Postlewaite, Andrew and Samuelson, Larry, Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (June 17, 2013). PIER Working Paper No. 13-028, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2283156 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2283156

Qingmin Liu

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7908 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

HW Arndt Building
College of Business and Economics
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Andrew Postlewaite (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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