Off the Record: The National Security Council, Drone Killings, and Historical Accountability

38 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2013 Last revised: 8 Dec 2021

See all articles by Douglas Cox

Douglas Cox

CUNY School of Law

Ramzi Kassem

City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

The central and expanding role of the National Security Council in compiling the "kill list" of U.S. citizens and others approved for drone killing outside of recognized battlefields highlights the largely overlooked fact that, since the mid-1990s, the US. government has taken the categorical position that the National Security Council is exempt from both the documentation requirements of the Federal Records Act and the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. The current situation undermines long-term processes of accountability for, and transparency about, drone killings, and hinders the role of Congress and the courts in providing a check on executive power. This Article argues that stronger documentation and disclosure requirements are necessary to restore the National Security Council's accountability to Congress, the public, and history.

Keywords: drones, National Security Council, extrajudicial killing, secrecy, classification, FOIA, Federal Records Act, Presidential Records Act, national security

Suggested Citation

Cox, Douglas and Kassem, Ramzi, Off the Record: The National Security Council, Drone Killings, and Historical Accountability (2014). Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 31, p.363, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2283243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2283243

Douglas Cox

CUNY School of Law ( email )

2 Court Square
Long Island City, NY 11101
United States

Ramzi Kassem (Contact Author)

City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law ( email )

2 Court Square West
Long Island City, NY 11101-4356
United States
(718) 340-4558 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.cuny.edu/faculty/directory/kassem/

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