Reputations in Repeated Games
86 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2013
Date Written: June 27, 2013
Abstract
This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.
Keywords: commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations
JEL Classification: C70, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Mailath, George J. and Samuelson, Larry, Reputations in Repeated Games (June 27, 2013). PIER Working Paper No. 13-034, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2286763 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2286763
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