Reciprocity and the Regulatory Function of International Investment Law

54 Harv. Int'l L. J. Online 124 (2013)

Posted: 13 Aug 2013

Date Written: January 15, 2013

Abstract

Jason Yackee has proposed two important, attractive, and politically plausible reforms to the international investment law system: (i) a "notice and comment" style procedure to allow states to comment on draft tribunal awards before they are issued, and (ii) a "legislative veto" procedure by which state constituents could annul the legal or precedential value of tribunal decision. This response critiques Yackee's administrative agency analogy and argues that we are more likely to find profitable institutional insights from multijurisdictional common law tort systems. But it endorses his proposals on alternative theoretical grounds and argues that they offer an attractive response to the slow-burn crisis of legitimacy that has dogged the regime for more than a decade.

Keywords: BIT, NAFTA, ICSID, IIL, international investment law, bilateral investment treaty

Suggested Citation

Mortenson, Julian Davis, Reciprocity and the Regulatory Function of International Investment Law (January 15, 2013). 54 Harv. Int'l L. J. Online 124 (2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2286847

Julian Davis Mortenson (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States

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