Common vs. Firm-Specific Risks in Relative Performance Evaluation
32 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2013
Date Written: July 1, 2013
Abstract
This paper examines the trade-off between common and peers’ specific risks in relative performance evaluation (RPE). We establish that in order to remove common risk completely from management compensation contracts, it is sufficient and necessary that peers’ weighted specific risks are lower. Nonetheless, common risk needs not to be removed completely; the optimal use of RPE therefore entails a partial substitution of common for peers’ specific risks unless firms can hedge against peers’ specific risks. These results contribute to our understanding of factors affecting a firm’s peer choices and provide specific implications for the weak- vs. strong-form RPE tests.
Keywords: relative performance evaluation, the cost-benefit trade-off between common and firm-specific risks, the choice of peer firms, executive compensation
JEL Classification: J3, M2
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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