Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers

46 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2013

See all articles by Mike Burkart

Mike Burkart

Swedish House of Finance; London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Finance; Finance Theory Group (FTG); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Denis Gromb

HEC Paris

Holger M. Mueller

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Fausto Panunzi

Bocconi University - Department of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 5 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 3, 2013

Abstract

This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal investor protection increases bidders’ outside funding capacity. However, absent effective bidding competition, this does not improve efficiency, as the bid price – and thus the bidder’s need for funds increases one-for-one with his pledgeable income. In contrast, under effective competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity improves efficiency by making it less likely that more efficient but less wealthy bidders are outbid by less efficient but wealthier rivals.

Keywords: Takeovers, Financial Constraints, Legal Investor Protection

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Burkart, Mike C. and Gromb, Denis and Mueller, Holger M. and Panunzi, Fausto, Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers (July 3, 2013). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2289217

Mike C. Burkart

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Finance Theory Group (FTG) ( email )

United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/default_static.htm

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Denis Gromb

HEC Paris

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

Holger M. Mueller

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0341 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~hmueller/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Fausto Panunzi (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
20136 Milan
Italy
+39 02 5836 5327 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 5343 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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