Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games

41 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2013

See all articles by Dirk Engelmann

Dirk Engelmann

Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics; Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic; University of Copenhagen; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

H. P. Gruner

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2013

Abstract

Optimal voting rules have to be adjusted to the underlying distribution of preferences. However, in practice there usually is no social planner who can perform this task. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals’ payoffs if players are not all completely selfish. We run three closely related experimental treatments (plus two control treatments) to understand how privately informed individuals decide when they choose voting rules and when they vote. Efficiency concerns play an important role on the rule choice stage whereas selfish behavior seems to dominate at the voting stage. Accordingly, in an asymmetric setting groups that can choose a voting rule do better than those who decide with a given simple majority voting rule.

Keywords: Bayesian voting experiments, revelation principle, Two-stage voting

JEL Classification: C91, D70, D82

Suggested Citation

Engelmann, Dirk and Grüner, Hans Peter, Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games (July 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9544, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2291365

Dirk Engelmann

Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Spandauer Str. 1
Berlin, D-10099
Germany

Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic ( email )

Prague
Czech Republic

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Nørregade 10
Copenhagen, København DK-1165
Denmark

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Hans Peter Grüner

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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