Verification in International Agreements
37 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2013
Date Written: 2013
Abstract
Why do states sometimes choose stronger verification mechanisms in international agreements, while other times not? Verification mechanisms refer to the monitoring, reporting, and oversight provisions within an international agreement. I argue that the strength of verification mechanisms depends on two factors: the duration of an agreement (the time horizon) and how much states care about the agreement in the future (the discount rate). This argument tests hypotheses from behavioral economics, and argues that a low discount rate coupled with a short time horizon results in strong verification. I compile new data on verification mechanisms in international agreements that complement Koremenos’ Continent of International Law. Preliminary analysis demonstrates support for the behavioral economics hypotheses and little support for rational institutionalist and realist arguments. The paper revisits “the shadow of the future” and reexamines the concept in terms of its two component parts: time horizon and discount rate. It also bridges the IPE-Security gap in international relations through use of a cross-issue large-N sample instead of selecting cases within a single issue area.
Keywords: Verification, Monitoring, International Institutions, Behavioral Economics, International Security, International Law
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