Early Retirement Incentives and Student Achievement

49 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2013

See all articles by Maria Donovan Fitzpatrick

Maria Donovan Fitzpatrick

Cornell University; NBER

Michael Lovenheim

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis and Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 29, 2013

Abstract

Early retirement incentives (ERIs) are increasingly prevalent in education as districts seek to close budget gaps by replacing expensive experienced teachers with lower-cost newer teachers. Combined with the aging of the teacher workforce, these ERIs are likely to change the composition of teachers dramatically in the coming years. We use exogenous variation from an ERI program in Illinois in the mid-1990s to provide the first evidence in the literature of the effects of large-scale teacher retirements on student achievement. We find the program did not reduce test scores; likely, it increased them, with positive effects most pronounced in lower-SES schools.

Keywords: teacher retirement, early retirement incentives, teacher experience

JEL Classification: J260, I210, I280, H750

Suggested Citation

Fitzpatrick, Maria Donovan and Lovenheim, Michael, Early Retirement Incentives and Student Achievement (July 29, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4347, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2302526 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2302526

Maria Donovan Fitzpatrick

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States
607-255-1272 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.human.cornell.edu/bio.cfm?netid=mdf98

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Michael Lovenheim (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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