Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

88 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2013

See all articles by George J. Mailath

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: August 11, 2013

Abstract

This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

Keywords: commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations

JEL Classification: C70, C73

Suggested Citation

Mailath, George J. and Samuelson, Larry, Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version (August 11, 2013). PIER Working Paper No. 13-044, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2308937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2308937

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

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Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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