An Economic Analysis of 'Riding to Hounds': Pierson V. Post Revisited
Posted: 7 Sep 2000
Date Written: Undated
Abstract
Pierson v. Post, an 1805 New York case, concerns the ownership of a dead fox; Post had organized a fox hunt and pursuing a fox, when Pierson appeared and killed the animal. The rule established by the court in this case (awarding ownership to Pierson) has proven to be highly influential. This paper undertakes an economic analysis of the issues raised by the case. The incentives for the killing of foxes created by the court's rule and the alternative rule, giving property rights to Post, advocated in a vigorous dissent by Justice Livingston are analyzed. The consequences for social welfare are derived under various circumstances; the formal approach leads to a number of new insights. Finally, the implications of this analysis for contemporary issues in property law are explored through applications to the areas of oil and gas, the broadcast spectrum, and "cybersquatting" (involving the ownership of internet domain names).
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