Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union

32 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2013

See all articles by Harald Uhlig

Harald Uhlig

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2013

Abstract

This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds. I argue that regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, while regulators in other “safe” countries will impose tighter regulation. As a result, governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank.

Keywords: bank regulation, common central bank, ECB, Euro zone crisis, European Central Bank, haircuts, repurchase operations, risk shifting, sovereign default risk

JEL Classification: E51, E58, E61, E65, G21, G28, H63

Suggested Citation

Uhlig, Harald, Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union (August 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9606, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2312980

Harald Uhlig (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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