Impact of FDICIA Internal Controls on Bank Risk Taking

36 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2013 Last revised: 14 Nov 2013

See all articles by Justin Yiqiang Jin

Justin Yiqiang Jin

McMaster University - DeGroote School of Business

Kiridaran (Giri) Kanagaretnam

York University - Schulich School of Business

Gerald J. Lobo

University of Houston - C.T. Bauer College of Business

Robert Mathieu

Wilfrid Laurier University

Date Written: September 1, 2012

Abstract

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005) for bank risk taking prior to the recent financial crisis and its consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1,138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.

Keywords: FDICIA, Internal Controls, Bank Risk Taking, Bank Failure, Bank Troubles

JEL Classification: G14, G21, M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Jin, Justin Y. and Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran and Lobo, Gerald J. and Mathieu, Robert, Impact of FDICIA Internal Controls on Bank Risk Taking (September 1, 2012). Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 37, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2320282 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2320282

Justin Y. Jin

McMaster University - DeGroote School of Business ( email )

1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4M4
Canada
905-525-9140 ext. 26194 (Phone)
905-521-8995 (Fax)

Kiridaran Kanagaretnam (Contact Author)

York University - Schulich School of Business ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada

Gerald J. Lobo

University of Houston - C.T. Bauer College of Business ( email )

Houston, TX 77204-6021
United States
713-743-4838 (Phone)
713-743-4828 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bauer.uh.edu/acct/acctprofile.asp?search=Gerald%20Lobo

Robert Mathieu

Wilfrid Laurier University ( email )

75 University Ave W
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5
Canada
519-884-1970, x3142 (Phone)

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