Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Posted: 5 Sep 2013

See all articles by Philip Reny

Philip Reny

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 3, 2013

Abstract

We provide several generalizations of the various equilibrium existence results in Reny (1999), Barelli and Meneghel (2013), and McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011). We also provide an example demonstrating that a natural additional generalization is not possible. All of the theorems yielding existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria here are stated in terms of the players' preference relations over joint strategies. Hence, in contrast to virtually all of the previous work in the area the present results for pure strategy equilibria are entirely ordinal, as they should be.

Keywords: discontinuous games, Nash equilibrium, pure strategies, ordinal

JEL Classification: C60, C72

Suggested Citation

Reny, Philip, Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games (September 3, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2320656

Philip Reny (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

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