Organizational Structure, Police Activity and Crime

29 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2013 Last revised: 15 Apr 2015

See all articles by Itai Ater

Itai Ater

Tel Aviv University - The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration

Yehonatan Givati

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Oren Rigbi

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Date Written: August 3, 2013

Abstract

We examine the consequences of an organizational reform in Israel that transferred the responsibility for housing arrestees from the Police to the Prison Authority. Using the staggered introduction of the reform in different regions of the country, we document strong evidence that this organizational change led to an increase of 11 percent in the number of arrests and to a decrease of 4 percent in the number of reported crimes, with these effects concentrated in more minor crimes. The reform also led to a decrease in the quality of arrests, measured by the likelihood of being charged following an arrest. These findings are consistent with the idea that the reform externalized the cost of housing arrestees from the Police's perspective, and therefore led the Police to increase its activity against crime.

Keywords: Organizational Structure, Economics of Crime, Jails, Arrests

JEL Classification: H10, K14, K40, L30

Suggested Citation

Ater, Itai and Givati, Yehonatan and Rigbi, Oren, Organizational Structure, Police Activity and Crime (August 3, 2013). Journal of Public Economics 115: 62-71 (2014), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326928 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326928

Itai Ater (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration ( email )

P.O. Box 39010
Ramat Aviv Tel Aviv 69972, 69978
Israel

Yehonatan Givati

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Jerusalem
Mount Scopus, 91905
Israel

Oren Rigbi

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev ( email )

1 Ben-Gurion Blvd
Beer-Sheba 84105, 84105
Israel

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