Finking Frankfurt

Philosophical Studies, 2007

8 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2013

See all articles by Daniel Cohen

Daniel Cohen

Charles Sturt University

Toby Handfield

Monash University

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been 'finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt devise - e.g. the addiction - is intrinsic to the agent.

Keywords: Moral responsibility, Harry Frankfurt, rational capacities, dispositions, counterfactuals

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Daniel and Handfield, Toby, Finking Frankfurt (2007). Philosophical Studies, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2328553 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2328553

Daniel Cohen

Charles Sturt University ( email )

Panorama Avenue
Bathurst, NSW 2678
Australia

Toby Handfield (Contact Author)

Monash University ( email )

3800
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://tobyhandfield.com

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