Download This PaperSupplement to: 'Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma'
6 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2013 Last revised: 6 Jun 2014
Date Written: May 7, 2014
Abstract
We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993).
The paper "Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma" to which this Supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2331579
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Daley, Brendan and Sadowski, Philipp, Supplement to: 'Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma' (May 7, 2014). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 155, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2331585 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331585
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