Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Forthcoming

22 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2013

Date Written: April 20, 2013

Abstract

If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods.

Keywords: rational choice, transitivity, status quo bias, incommensurate value, practical reason

Suggested Citation

Handfield, Toby, Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness (April 20, 2013). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2331864 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331864

Toby Handfield (Contact Author)

Monash University ( email )

3800
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://tobyhandfield.com

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