Economic Rationalities of Governance and Ambiguity in the Criminalization of Cartels

British Journal of Criminology, (2012) 52, 974–996, doi:10.1093/bjc/azs034

24 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2013 Last revised: 20 Feb 2014

See all articles by Christine Parker

Christine Parker

Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne

Date Written: October 27, 2012

Abstract

In July 2009, Australia introduced criminal offences and jail for collusive conduct (price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid rigging) in markets. The substance of the justification for criminalization of cartel conduct is ‘blindly’ economic. It does not spring from a sense of moral or political outrage at collusion in the market. Rather, it is justified on the basis of effective regulatory technique, the need to deter economically harmful behaviour. This paper examines the rationality of anti-cartel law from the point of view of the ‘legal consciousness’ of 25 business people who have faced enforcement action for cartel conduct. Their justifications for their own behaviour in light of the law tell us about how they believe the law can be legitimated. This is compared with policy and scholarly rationales for criminal anti-cartel law. The paper finds that, among business people who have been made subject to the anti-cartel law, there are similar differences and ambiguities about the rationale for criminal anti-cartel law, and the very meaning of acting economically, as there are among scholars and policy elites. This pinpoints one place of instability in the legitimacy of economic rationalities of regulation and governance in action.

Keywords: deterrence, regulation, competition law, white-collar crime, economic

Suggested Citation

Parker, Christine, Economic Rationalities of Governance and Ambiguity in the Criminalization of Cartels (October 27, 2012). British Journal of Criminology, (2012) 52, 974–996, doi:10.1093/bjc/azs034, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2336827

Christine Parker (Contact Author)

Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://law.unimelb.edu.au/about/staff/christine-parker

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