Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence

52 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2013

See all articles by Anke Gerber

Anke Gerber

Universität Hamburg

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Date Written: October 16, 2013

Abstract

We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals’ information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find that there is more redistribution behind a veil of ignorance than under full information. However, the scope of redistribution is less sensitive towards the degree of uncertainty than predicted. For all degrees of uncertainty, we find a coexistence of libertarianism and redistribution as well as incomplete sorting, so that heterogeneous redistribution communities turn out to be sustainable.

Keywords: constitutional choice, experimental economics, redistribution, veil of ignorance, voting by feet

JEL Classification: C910, D020, D630, H240, K000

Suggested Citation

Gerber, Anke and Nicklisch, Andreas and Voigt, Stefan, Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence (October 16, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4423, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2340946 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2340946

Anke Gerber (Contact Author)

Universität Hamburg ( email )

Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, D-20354
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
49 228 9141679 (Phone)
49 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/nicklisch.html

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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