The Politics of Accounting Standard-Setting: A Review of Empirical Research

54 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2013 Last revised: 16 Dec 2013

See all articles by Brandon Gipper

Brandon Gipper

Stanford University Graduate School of Business

Brett Lombardi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; University of Melbourne - Department of Accounting & Business Information Systems

Douglas J. Skinner

The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 17, 2013

Abstract

We provide an overview of the empirical literature on the politics of accounting standard setting, focusing on the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Although it is clear from casual observation that politics sometimes plays a first-order role in the determination of accounting standards, we argue that more can be done to improve our understanding of this important topic. Based on our review, we outline what we see to be a number of potentially fruitful directions for future research.

Keywords: Accounting standards, FASB, politics, lobbying, economic consequences

JEL Classification: M41

Suggested Citation

Gipper, Brandon and Lombardi, Brett J. and Lombardi, Brett J. and Skinner, Douglas J., The Politics of Accounting Standard-Setting: A Review of Empirical Research (October 17, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2342001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2342001

Brandon Gipper

Stanford University Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
(650)498-4350 (Phone)

Brett J. Lombardi

University of Melbourne - Department of Accounting & Business Information Systems ( email )

Victoria, 3010
Australia

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Douglas J. Skinner (Contact Author)

The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7137 (Phone)

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