Transaction Costs and Shadow Prices in Discrete Time

20 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2013

See all articles by Christoph Czichowsky

Christoph Czichowsky

Vienna University of Technology

Johannes Muhle-Karbe

Imperial College London - Department of Mathematics

Walter Schachermayer

Universität Wien, Fakultät für Mathematik

Date Written: June 20, 2013

Abstract

For portfolio choice problems with proportional transaction costs, we discuss whether or not there exists a shadow price, i.e., a least favorable frictionless market extension leading to the same optimal strategy and utility.

By means of an explicit counter-example, we show that shadow prices may fail to exist even in seemingly perfectly benign situations, i.e., for a log-investor trading in an arbitrage-free market with bounded prices and arbitrarily small transaction costs.

We also clarify the connection between shadow prices and duality theory. Whereas dual minimizers need not lead to shadow prices in the above "global" sense, we show that they always correspond to a "local" version.

Keywords: transaction costs, utility maximization, shadow price, convex duality

JEL Classification: G11, C61

Suggested Citation

Czichowsky, Christoph and Muhle-Karbe, Johannes and Schachermayer, Walter, Transaction Costs and Shadow Prices in Discrete Time (June 20, 2013). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 13-51, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2342201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2342201

Christoph Czichowsky

Vienna University of Technology ( email )

Karlsplatz 13
Vienna
Austria

Johannes Muhle-Karbe (Contact Author)

Imperial College London - Department of Mathematics ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Imperial College
LONDON, SW7 1NE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.ma.imperial.ac.uk/~jmuhleka/

Walter Schachermayer

Universität Wien, Fakultät für Mathematik ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria
(+43-1) 4277-50723 (Phone)
(+43-1) 4277-850723 (Fax)

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