Do MSRPs Decrease Prices?

31 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2013 Last revised: 1 Nov 2016

See all articles by Babur De los Santos

Babur De los Santos

Clemson University

In Kim

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics

Dmitry Lubensky

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Date Written: September 22, 2016

Abstract

The nature of manufacturer’s suggested retail prices (MSRPs) and whether their effect is pro- or anticompetitive is not well understood. We exploit a policy experiment in which a ban on MSRPs was imposed and then lifted a year later. We show that average prices increased by 2.1 percent as a result of the MSRP ban and decreased by 3.8 percent when the ban was lifted. We find no indication that MSRPs lowered prices by acting as binding price ceilings and outline an alternative mechanism in which recommendations affect prices by nudging more consumers to search. We demonstrate that recommendations can increase search and reduce prices.

Keywords: recommended retail price, suggested retail price, list price, non-binding price, search with uncertainty, vertical restraints, resale price maintenance

JEL Classification: L110, L400, L810

Suggested Citation

De los Santos, Babur and Kim, In and Lubensky, Dmitry, Do MSRPs Decrease Prices? (September 22, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2350364 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350364

Babur De los Santos (Contact Author)

Clemson University ( email )

228 Sirrine Hall
Clemson, SC 29634
United States
864-656-3953 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://babur.people.clemson.edu

In Kim

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States

Dmitry Lubensky

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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